Idaho Law Review
Volume 57

Number 3

Article 9

November 2022

Private Prison Telecom Corporations and State Action: How This
One Trick Will Allow Plaintiffs to Disrupt an $8 Billion Industry
Connor McCleskey

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho-law-review

Recommended Citation
Connor McCleskey, Private Prison Telecom Corporations and State Action: How This One Trick Will Allow
Plaintiffs to Disrupt an $8 Billion Industry, 57 IDAHO L. REV. (2022).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho-law-review/vol57/iss3/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Idaho Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information,
please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

PRIVATE PRISON TELECOM CORPORATIONS AND STATE
ACTION: HOW THIS ONE TRICK WILL ALLOW PLAINTIFFS
TO DISRUPT AN $8 BILLION INDUSTRY
CONNOR MCCLESKEY*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 635
II. A PRIMER ON THE PRISON TELECOM INDUSTRY .............................................. 639
A. History ......................................................................................................... 639
B. The Impact of the Industry .......................................................................... 640
III. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE ................................................................................... 642
A. Federal Regulations and State Laws ............................................................ 643
B. Prison Telecom Litigation............................................................................. 647
i. Litigation in Federal Courts and Why It Fails ............................................ 648
ii. Constitutional Claims ............................................................................... 649
IV. THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE: WHY CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS FAIL ............ 651
V. WHY PRISON TELECOM CORPORATIONS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED
STATE ACTORS ............................................................................................... 654
A. Prison telecom corporations assist law enforcement agencies with
prosecution and rights violations by recording phone calls,
performing biometric surveillance, and phone tapping attorneys. .............. 654
B. Prison telecom corporations shape corrections policies and
regulations through bidding, lobbying, and influence. ................................. 657
C. Prison telecom corporations return money extracted from
incarcerated people and their families to corrections agencies,
funding vital government functions. ............................................................. 659
D. Corrections agencies write contracts and requests for proposals
that often direct every action of providers. .................................................. 660
VI. LOOKING FORWARD TO A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PHONE CALLS .......... 660
VII. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 661
I. INTRODUCTION
For incarcerated people, the telephone is a lifeline. Many people behind bars
rely on it as the primary means of communication, especially for those who are
incarcerated in out-of-state facilities, far away from their families. The COVID-19
pandemic has only increased the importance of phone access: many facilities
suspended or ended visits in early 2020 to curb the spread of the virus and, as of
January 2021, those visits have not resumed. 1
* B.A. Oberlin College, J.D. Georgetown University Law Center. This Article is built upon the work
of the countless dedicated activists who have spent decades fighting for prison abolition and phone
justice.
1. See, e.g., The Most Significant Criminal Justice Policy Changes From the COVID-19 Pandemic,
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/virus/virusresponse.html (last updated Apr. 6,
2021).
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Over the past three decades, correctional facilities have almost entirely
privatized the provision of telephone services.2 Nearly every correctional agency in
the country charges incarcerated individuals for phone calls, and most contract with
just a handful of niche telecom corporations that cater to the correctional market.3
In exchange for exclusive contracts to provide telephone service to everyone
incarcerated in a given facility, the prison telecom corporations offer correctional
agencies kickbacks—known as “commissions”—on the cost of each phone call.4
As a result of this dynamic, the cost of a call for someone behind bars reached
as high as $25 for a 15-minute phone call.5 And, because incarcerated people are
often paid just pennies an hour for work,6 their families and friends are usually
responsible for paying for the cost of these calls. The burden of paying for
communication falls hardest upon Black and Brown women that are already living
with the experience of having a loved one in prison or jail.7 But, the industry’s harms
stretch beyond just the cost of telephone calls: prison telecom corporations are
notorious for employing deceptive billing practices, 8 promoting ever-widening

2. See, e.g., Steven J. Jackson, Ex-Communication: Competition and Collusion in the U.S. Prison
Telephone
Industry,
22
CRIT.
STUD.
MEDIA
COMM.
263
(2005),
https://sjackson.infosci.cornell.edu/Jackson_CompetitionandCollusioninPrisonPhoneIndustry(CSMC20
05).pdf.
3. Id. at 269 (noting that, by 1995, 90% of all correctional agencies derived a profit from phone
calls); Michael Sainato, ‘They’re Profiting Off the Pain’: The Push to Reign in the $1.2bn Prison Phone
Industry,
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
26,
2019,
5:02
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2019/nov/26/theyre-profiting-off-pain-the-push-to-rein-in-the-12bn-prison-phone-industry
(discussing the two corporations that control 70% of the market).
4. Peter Wagner & Alexi Jones, On Kickbacks and Commissions in the Prison and Jail Phone
Market, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Feb. 11, 2019) [hereinafter Wagner & Jones, On Kickbacks and
Commissions], https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2019/02/11/kickbacks-and-commissions/; see also
Sarah
Betancourt,
Costly
Connections,
COMMONWEALTH
(July
28,
2020),
https://commonwealthmagazine.org/criminal-justice/costly-connections/.
5. Kiran Misra, The Biden FCC Needs to Tackle Exorbitant Jail and Prison Call Prices, SLATE (Dec. 21,
2020, 11:02 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2020/12/biden-fcc-prison-jail-phone-video-costs.html;
see also Peter Wagner & Alexi Jones, State of Phone Justice: Local Jails, State Prisons and Private Phone
Providers,
PRISON
POL’Y
INITIATIVE
(Feb.
2019),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/phones/state_of_phone_justice.html.
6. See Wendy Sawyer, How Much Do Incarcerated People Earn in Each State?, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/04/10/wages/.
7. Saneta de Vuono-Powell et al., Who Pays? The True Cost of Incarceration on Families, ELLA BAKER
CTR., FORWARD TOGETHER, RESEARCH ACTION DESIGN (2015), http://whopaysreport.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/Who-Pays-FINAL.pdf.
8. See, e.g., Steven Cohen, $25m Global Tel Link Settlement Reached for Inmates, TOP CLASS
ACTIONS (June 1, 2020), https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-news/civil-rights/25mglobal-tel-link-settlement-reached-for-inmates/.
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surveillance of incarcerated people and their families,9 and spying on confidential
attorney-client phone calls.10
The industry’s harms have been recognized for decades. Activists, news
outlets, and federal and state regulators have all attempted to expose and
challenge the exploitative prison telecom model. 11 During the surge of Black Lives
Matter uprisings and protests in the summer of 2020, demonstrators incorporated
“Prison Phone Justice” into their broader calls for justice and abolition. 12 However,
these efforts have frequently run into a business model that ensures widespread
resistance to even the slightest measure intended to provide relief to families.
Through the cost of calls, the prison telecom industry siphons off countless
resources from communities of color, compounding the damage caused by racist
over-policing and systemic underinvestment. Corporations share about 50% of
their telephone charges with correctional agencies through kickbacks called “site
commissions.”13 These payments have become huge sources of revenue for many
small-town jails and sheriffs’ departments.14 As a result, the industry and law
enforcement march in lockstep against any legislative or regulatory reform.
Unsurprisingly, these forces have led to a legal landscape that is hostile to
plaintiffs. People wronged by this industry often have no legal recourse, even if

9. Peter Wagner & Alexi Jones, State of Phone Justice: Local Jails, State Prisons and Private Phone
Providers,
PRISON
POL’Y
INITIATIVE
(Feb.
2019),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/phones/state_of_phone_justice.html; David Grossman, Prisons Are
Building Giant Biometric Databases of Prisoners' Voices, POPULAR MECHANICS (Feb. 1, 2019),
https://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/security/a26112865/us-biometric-voice-archivesprisoners/ (discussing databases of “voice prints” of callers collected by private corporations).
10. Karl Bode, Securus Quietly Settles Lawsuit Over Illegally Spying on Inmate Attorney
Conversations,
TECHDIRT
(June
1,
2020,
3:44
PM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20200522/08004544553/securus-quietly-settles-lawsuit-overillegally-spying-inmate-attorney-conversations.shtml.
11. See, e.g., Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services, Second Report and Order and Third
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 30 F.C.C. Rcd. 12763 (Nov. 5, 2015).
12. Tell Congress: Pass the COVID-19 Compassion and Martha Wright Prison Phone Justice Act,
COLOR
OF
CHANGE,
https://act.colorofchange.org/sign/congress_martha_wright_reed?source=coc_main_website
(last
visited Feb. 10, 2021).
13. See Wagner, supra note 9; see also Brittany J. Finder, Aligning Practice and Principles: A Call
to Eliminate the Use of Site Commissions in Inmate Calling System Contracts, PUBLIC CONTRACT L.J. (Dec.
11,
2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_contract_law/publications/public_contract_law_jrnl/462/eliminate-inmate-calling/.
14 . Peter Wagner & Alexi Jones, On Kickbacks and Commissions in the Prison and Jail Phone
Market,
PRISON
POL’Y
INITIATIVE
(Feb.
11,
2019),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2019/02/11/kickbacks-and-commissions/; Sarah Betancourt, Costly
Connections, COMMONWEALTH MAG. (July 28, 2020), https://commonwealthmagazine.org/criminaljustice/costly-connections/.

638

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

VOL. 57

they are subjected to corporate behavior that would be unimaginable for many in
the free world.15 At the federal level, the industry has used legal challenges to water
down attempts to lower the cost of calls nationwide.16 Recently, activists have
begun to bring suits against prison telecom corporations under a variety of different
causes of action.17 But, courts have rejected many of these challenges, often due to
the providers’ unique role as private vendors within a public system. 18
One reason why prison telecom corporations are so rarely sued in court is
because judges have largely refused to entertain constitutional claims against
them.19 For the most part, constitutional claims have failed after judges conclude
that plaintiffs cannot meet the “state actor” requirement. 20 But, while telecom
providers may be private corporations, they are increasingly exercising an
enormous amount of coercive power over incarcerated people and their families. 21
In many facilities, prison telecom corporations operate massive surveillance
systems, often without a warrant.22 And, with almost no oversight by courts or
regulators, abuses are common.23
Still, judges find that corporations are not state actors for a variety of reasons.
Many suits are filed pro se, and judges are historically particularly hostile to
incarcerated self-represented plaintiffs.24 Moreover, given the litany of decisions
denying that prison telecom corporations are state actors, many resource-strapped

15. The Prison Industry: How it Started. How it Works. How it Harms., WORTH RISES,
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58e127cb1b10e31ed45b20f4/t/5ff2bbe318d44937a922e754/1
609743335995/The+Prison+Industry++How+It+Started%2C+How+It+Works%2C+and+How+It+Harms+%28December+2020%29.pdf (p. 53
discussing how prison telecom corporations seize unused funds after 90 days, cap deposits at $50 to
maximize deposit fees, among other exploitative practices).
16. See generally 30 F.C.C. Rcd. 12763.
17. NELSON ET AL., NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, COMMERCIALIZED (IN)JUSTICE LITIGATION GUIDE 44
(2020), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/criminal-justice/WP_Litigation_Guide.pdf.
18. Id.
19. See cases cited infra note 120.
20. See discussion infra Section II.A.ii.
21. See discussion infra Section IV; see also George Joseph & Debbie Nathan, Prisons Across the
U.S. Are Quietly Building Databases of Incarcerated People’s Voice Prints, INTERCEPT (Jan. 30, 2019, 9:00
AM), https://theintercept.com/2019/01/30/prison-voice-prints-databases-securus/.
22. See infra pp. 632–33 nn. 172-175.
23. See generally A Lawsuit Aims to End the Prison Telephone Racket, BOSTON GLOBE (May 5, 2018,
1:05 AM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2018/05/05/lawsuit-aims-end-prisontelephone-racket/owb0PuEzRgs8BkJjUwJXaP/story.html.
24. See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Posner: Most Judges Regard Pro Se Litigants as 'Kind of Trash
Not
Worth
the
Time',
ABA
JOURNAL
(Sept.
11,
2017,
22:57
AM),
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/posner_most_judges_regard_pro_se_litigants_as_kind_of_
trash_nor_worth_the_t (quoting retired federal Judge Richard Posner as saying that “most judges regard
[pro se litigants] as kind of trash not worth the time of a federal judge”).
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social justice lawyers and advocates may choose to devote their time and energy to
litigation that is more likely to succeed.25
However, even under the current law, prison telecom corporations are state
actors.26 They gather evidence for criminal trials, perform warrantless wiretaps—
and even provide the majority of the funding for some corrections agencies. 27
Under any definition—legal or common sense—these corporations have become
inexorably intertwined with corrections agencies.
And, the failure to recognize that they are state actors has implications that
reach beyond just the telecom industry. It impacts the entire U.S. prison system.
Nearly every service has been privatized and commodified.28 In many facilities,
corporations have entirely taken over the day-to-day operation of incarceration
from government agencies.29 And, as judges refuse to hold corporations
responsible for constitutional violations, it means that meager constitutional rights
are disappearing. It also means that, due to the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s
screening requirements,30 corporations do not have to even lift a finger to defend
against allegations of wrongdoing.31
In this Article, I will examine why the law currently fails to address the harms
of the prison telecom industry. First, I will provide a brief history of the industry and
its formation during the era of mass incarceration. Second, I will illustrate some of
the industry’s effects on individuals, communities and the law. Third, I will examine
why courts have been so hostile to suits brought against the industry and propose
several key reforms that could end this exploitation for good .
II. A PRIMER ON THE PRISON TELECOM INDUSTRY
A. History
Until the mid-1980s, phone calls in correctional facilities functioned like
payphones in the free world.32 At that time, AT&T dominated local telephone
service and payphones alike, and this control of the market included control over
payphones in prisons and jails.33 Then, after the Reagan administration broke up
25. See Stephen Raher, The Company Store and the Literally Captive Market: Consumer Law in
Prisons and Jails, 17 Hastings Race & Poverty L.J. 3, 40, 46 (2020) (noting that, although “litigation and
regulatory advocacy have produced victories, such efforts are unlikely to result in comprehensive
protections” without legislative action).
26. See infra Section IV.
27. See discussion infra Section IV.
28. See WORTH RISES, supra note 15 (discussing the U.S. prison system as a “vast matrix of publicprivate partnerships,” comprised of thousands of companies).
29. See generally id. (discussing twelve different sectors that have been privatized in prisons and
jails).
30. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
31. See infra note 130.
32. See Jackson, supra note 2, at 268.
33. See WORTH RISES, supra note 15, at 48.
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the AT&T monopoly, the market was flooded with a proliferation of new regional
providers.34 This trend carried over to prisons and jails, which began to contract
with a wider variety of prison telecom providers.35
This diversification was accompanied by a shift in how prison telephone
service was viewed. It ceased to be treated like a utility—like running water—that
people deserved to access freely. Instead, it became a service that could be
commodified and sold to incarcerated individuals and their families. Within a
decade of the end of the AT&T monopoly, nearly every correctional facility in the
country had switched to private telecom provider for phone service. 36
Unsurprisingly, these private corporations exploited their captive market. At the
time, a 15-minute call in some facilities cost $20, just for a local call. 37
The prison telecom industry did not grow in a vacuum. The same racist,
hateful policies that created the modern prison state fostered the growth of
privatized correctional services by creating the conditions for private telecom
corporations to thrive.38 More people incarcerated for longer terms, in more
isolated facilities39—separated from their communities and support networks. The
lucrative market soon attracted outside investment from private equity firms, who
acquired a foothold in the market, which then rapidly consolidated. 40
Today, the prison telecom industry is dominated by just two corporations,
each owned by high-profile private equity firms. The largest, GTL (formerly known
as Global Tel Link), controls contracts for telephone services in facilities with about
a million incarcerated individuals.41 The second largest corporation, Securus,
provides services for over 850,000 incarcerated people across hundreds of
facilities.42 Together, the two corporations control at least 90% of the prison
telecom market by most measures.43
B. The Impact of the Industry
Prison telecom corporations like GTL and Securus have exploited their
power over the market to charge exorbitant rates for phone calls. This business
34. See Jackson, supra note 2, at 268.
35. Id. at 268 (noting that, after the breakup of AT&T, new entrants to the market included “AT&T
rivals MCI and Sprint, followed closely by a series of dedicated start-ups”).
36. See WORTH RISES, supra note 15, at 49.
37. See Jackson, supra note 2, at 264.
38. A.E. Raza, Legacies of the Racialization of Incarceration: From Convict-lease to the Prison
Industrial Complex. 11 J. INST. JUST. INT’L STUD. 159 (discussing in general how racist attitudes drive
attempts to monetize the carceral system).
39. Jacob Kang-Brown & Ram Subramanian, Out of Sight: The Growth of Jails in Rural America,
VERA INST. OF JUST. (June 2017), https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/out-of-sight-growth-ofjails-rural-america.pdf (concluding that, between 2007 and 2017, the carceral population has increase
in rural areas).
40. See WORTH RISES, supra note 15, at 49.
41. See id. at 52.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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model has broad, deleterious effects on incarcerated individuals and their entire
networks. And, given the racist nature of the criminal-legal system, this impact also
falls hardest on Black and Brown communities.44
The cost of telephone calls places an enormous financial burden on
incarcerated people, who already face a system of overlapping forces that
effectively prevent them from ever obtaining financial stability. Due to decades of
racist policies and systemic disinvestment in communities of color, people
convicted of crimes have disproportionately less wealth than people without
criminal-legal system contact.45 Then, after being convicted, many incarcerated
individuals are often saddled with mountains of fines and fees imposed by the
criminal-legal system.46 Finally, once they are actually in prison, incarcerated
individuals can be forced to work for just cents a day.47 For instance, states like
North Carolina force people behind bars to work menial jobs producing furniture
and supplies for state agencies,48 but pay them as little as five cent per hour.49 At
that rate, someone in a North Carolina prison would have to work for sixty hours to
pay for a single 15-minute in-state call, due to GTL’s rates.50
Since incarcerated people cannot afford the cost of calls, the burden
overwhelmingly falls upon their families.51 Women—and Black and Brown women,
in particular—make up the vast majority of people responsible for paying these
costs.52 In a study conducted of people visiting San Quentin State Prison in
California, researchers found that most women spent “as much as one-third of their

44. See generally Saneta de Vuono-Powell et al., Who Pays? The True Cost of Incarceration on
Families,
ELLA BAKER CTR., FORWARD TOGETHER, RESEARCH ACTION DESIGN
(2015),
http://whopaysreport.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Who-Pays-FINAL.pdf (noting numerous ways
in which the costs of incarceration disproportionately impact Black and Latino individuals).
45. In fact, nearly two-thirds of people in jail fall below the poverty line. de Vuono-Powell et al.,
supra note 7, at 9; see also Meredith Booker, The Crippling Effect of Incarceration on Wealth, PRISON
POL’Y INITIATIVE (APR. 26, 2016), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2016/04/26/wealth/; see generally
Bryan L. Sykes & Michelle Maroto, A Wealth of Inequalities: Mass Incarceration, Employment, and Racial
Disparities in U.S. Household Wealth, 2
RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 129–152 (2016),
www.jstor.org/stable/10.7758/rsf.2016.2.6.07.
46. See, e.g., MATTHEW MENENDEZ ET AL., THE STEEP COSTS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE FEES AND FINES 5 (2019),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-07/2019_10_Fees%26Fines_Final.pdf.
47. See Wendy Sawyer, How Much Do Incarcerated People Earn in Each State?, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/04/10/wages/.
48.
North
Carolina
Prison
Inmates
at
Work,
N.C.
DEPT.
OF
CORR.,
https://www.doc.state.nc.us/work/workover.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2021).
49. Sawyer, supra note 6.
50.
NCDPS
Call
Rates,
PRISON
PHONE
JUSTICE
(Sept.
24,
2019),
https://www.prisonphonejustice.org/media/phonejustice/NC_DPS_Phone_Rates_September_2019.pd
f.
51. See generally de Vuono-Powell et all, supra note 7.
52. Id. at 30.
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annual income to maintain contact.”53 This extends to entire families, leading nearly
one in three families with an incarcerated loved one goes into debt just to pay for
the cost of staying in touch.54
By placing phone calls beyond the reach of many people behind bars, prison
telecom corporations isolate people from their support networks. This isolation has
an immeasurable negative impact on people’s wellbeing, especially individuals with
mental illness.55 Beyond the physical separation of prison walls, this communication
gap predictably drives people to despair. This does not just lead to desperation in
prisons, it prevents people from developing the bonds needed to succeed upon
their release.56 For instance, without easy access to phone calls, people cannot plan
where they are going to live or work, and they cannot keep in touch with family
members that are necessary for support. The cost of these severed bonds,
multiplied by the millions of people that enter the U.S. prison system each year is
unimaginable.
III. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
The prison telecom industry is governed by a patchwork of regulations and
laws at both the federal and state level. Nationwide, corporations are
predominantly regulated by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).57
Although there have been recent attempts by left-leaning legislators to pass laws
to lower the cost of phone calls using federal legislation,58 these have not yet been
successful.59 However, the COVID-19 pandemic has increased the urgency of these
legislative campaigns,60 and some long-standing phone justice legislation has made

53. Id.
54. See id. at 9.
55. See generally Craig Haney, Madness and Penal Confinement: Some Observations on Mental
Illness and Prison Pain, 19 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 310 (2017).
56. ITPI, How Private Prison Companies Increase Recidivism, IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 7 (June 2016),
https://www.inthepublicinterest.org/wp-content/uploads/ITPI-Recidivism-ResearchBrief-June2016.pdf
(finding that high rates “reduc[es] contact between prisoners and their home communities, increasing
recidivism”).
57. See, e.g., The Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., OFF. FOR C.R. & C.L.,
https://it.ojp.gov/privacyliberty/authorities/statutes/1288 (last visited June 23, 2021).
58. Press Release, Bobby L. Rush, Rep., House of Representatives, Rush Introduces Legislation to
Protect Inmates and Their Families from Unjust Charges for Communications Services (Mar. 26, 2020),
https://rush.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/rush-introduces-legislation-to-protect-inmatesand-their-families-from.
59. Martha Wright Prison Phone Justice Act, H.R. 6389 116th Cong.,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/116/hr6389 (noting that this bill “died in a previous Congress”
without a vote).
60. See, e.g., Advocates Deliver Petition for Prison Phone Justice, AMSTERDAM NEWS (Aug. 13, 2020),
http://amsterdamnews.com/news/2020/aug/13/advocates-deliver-petition-prison-phone-justice/.
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its way into relief legislation like, the HEROES Act.61 On the state level, regulation is
inconsistent. In many states, the prison telecom industry is effectively
unregulated,62 although some states with particularly active utility regulators have
taken action to lower costs and increase transparency in the industry.63

A. Federal Regulations and State Laws
At the federal level, the FCC is responsible for regulating any
telecommunications provider, including prison telephone corporations.64 The FCC’s
authority to regulate the cost of prison telephone calls, and telephone calls more
broadly, stems from the Communications Act of 1934. 65 That Act requires the
Commission to ensure that telephone calls are “just, reasonable, and fair” to the
“general public.”66 In general, however, the FCC may only regulate interstate
communication services, and must leave the regulation of purely intrastate
communications to individual states.67 But, a series of reforms included in the 1996
Telecommunications Act eroded the barrier against the FCC regulation of intrastate
61. See, e.g., Prison Policy Initiative, Inc., Comment Letter on Regulatory Requirements for
Alternative Operator Services Companies (Sept. 19, 2019) (urging Iowa to adopt state regulations for the
prison
telephone
industry),
https://wcc.efs.iowa.gov/cs/idcplg?IdcService=GET_FILE&dDocName=1877108&allowInterrupt=1&noS
aveAs=1&RevisionSelectionMethod=LatestReleased.
62. Omari Samkofa & Angie Jackson, Detroit Pistons Owner Tom Gores Speaks About Controversy
Over Secures (Feb. 4, 2021), https://www.freep.com/story/sports/nba/pistons/2021/02/04/tom-goresdetroit-pistons-securus-prison-phone-calls/4139871001/ (noting that the industry is unregulated in
Michigan); see also Timothy Williams, The High Cost of Calling the Imprisoned, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/31/us/steep-costs-of-inmate-phone-calls-are-under-scrutiny.html
(discussing how prison telecom is “largely unregulated”).
63. Lee Rood, Why Are Calls from Iowa Jails the Most Costly in the US? State Utilities Board Wants
to Know (May 31, 2019), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/2019/05/31/iowa-iainvestigates-phone-call-costs-charged-polk-county-jail-inmates-aclu-naacp/1290761001/;
David
Reutter, Alabama Public Service Commission Enacts Prison, Jail Phone Reforms, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Oct.
3, 2016), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2016/oct/3/alabama-public-service-commissionenacts-prison-jail-phone-reforms/.
64. See, e.g., The Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., OFFICE FOR C.R. & C.L.,
https://it.ojp.gov/privacyliberty/authorities/statutes/1288 (last revised Nov. 17, 2013).
65. Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services, 78 Fed. Reg. 67,956, 67,958 (adopted Aug. 9,
2013) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. Pt. 64). 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 (2021). Id. § 201(b).
66. Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services, 78 Fed. Reg. 67,956, 67,956. 47 U.S.C.A. § 151. Id.
§ 201(b).
67. See, e.g., New England Pub. Commc’ns. Council v. FCC, 334 F.3d 69, 75 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing
47 U.S.C. § 152(b)).
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communication.68 Specifically, Congress commanded the FCC to take action “to
promote competition among payphone service providers” including “inmate
telephone service in correctional institutions, and any ancillary services.” 69
Despite this legislative mandate, the Commission did not take any meaningful
action on the cost of prison phone calls. In fact, the Commission only acted on the
issue because of a nearly decade-long campaign by advocates and families of
incarcerated people.70 In 2000, a group of incarcerated people and their families
filed a lawsuit against a private prison operator and a group of prison telecom
corporations, alleging that the corporations signed exclusive contracts that led to
unfair rates for telephone calls.71 The named plaintiff in that case, Martha WrightReed, was a 74-year-old Black woman who had spent nearly $1,000 a year paying
for phone calls with her incarcerated grandson.72 Although the federal judge
hearing the case acknowledged that her case might have merit, she ultimately
decided that the FCC had primary jurisdiction over the matter and referred the case
to the Commission.73 The FCC was silent on the issue for over a decade.74
In 2012, the FCC issued its first significant rulemaking over the prison
telephone industry.75 After years of public pressure,76 deliberation and
rulemaking,77 the FCC announced a set of sweeping reforms. 78 Most notably, the

68. Raher, supra note 25 (discussing attempts by the industry to preempt state regulation using
the newly passed Communications Act).
69. 47 U.S.C. § 276 (2018).
70. Statement of Acting Chairwoman Mignon Clyburn Re: Rates for Interstate Calling Services
W.C. Dockett No. 12-375 (on file at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-322749A2.pdf); see
also Myaish Hayes, Prison Phone Justice is a Gender Justice Issue: The Legacy of Mrs. Martha WrightReed (Mar. 8, 2019), https://mediajustice.org/news/prison-phone-justice-is-a-gender-justice-issue-thelegacy-of-mrs-martha-wright-reed/.
71. Wright v. Corrs. Corp. of America, No. 00-293 (GK) (D.D.C. filed Oct. 8, 2003),
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-DC-0019-0003.pdf.
72. Justin Moyer, After Almost a Decade, FCC Has Yet to Rule on High Cost of Prison Phone Calls,
WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 2, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/after-almost-a-decadefcc-has-yet-to-rule-on-high-cost-of-prison-phone-calls/2012/12/02/b11ea164-2daf-11e2-9ac21c61452669c3_story.html.
73. Martha Wright v. Corrections Corporation of America (FCC Petition) Historic Case, CTR. FOR
CONST. HUMM. RTS., [hereinafter Martha Wright], https://ccrjustice.org/home/what-we-do/ourcases/martha-wright-v-corrections-corporation-america-fcc-petition (last updated July 6, 2009).
74. Id. See Case Timeline.
75. FCC Takes Action Toward Fair Prison Phone Rates and Stronger Communities, NATION INSIDE,
https://nationinside.org/campaign/campaign-for-prison-phone-justice/press/fcc-takes-action-towardfair-prison-phone-rates-and-stronger-communities/.
76. See, e.g., Case Timeline, supra note 74.
77. See, e.g., id. at 20; see also Raher, supra note 25 (noting that the Commission waited nearly
ten years to issue regulations).
78. Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Re: Rates for interstate rule making, (Dec. 24, 2012),
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/7022093344.pdf); see also John Danneberg, FF Order Heralds Hope for

2021

PRIVATE PRISON TELECOM CORPORATIONS AND
STATE ACTION: HOW THIS ONE TRICK WILL ALLOW
PLAINTIFFS TO DISRUPT AN $8 BILLION INDUSTRY

645

FCC announced a set of rate caps that would limit the cost of all local and longdistance calls from prisons at 11 cents per minute. 79 In addition, the FCC sought
comment on a number of other planned reforms, like supplemental caps on hidden
fees and secondary charges of calls.80 These new rate caps would immediately ease
the burden of paying for calls for countless incarcerated people and their
networks.81 In some jurisdictions, the cost of a 15-minute call would drop from $17
to just $1.65.82
Beyond the immediate savings to consumers, the FCC’s regulations were a
significant expansion of the agency’s authority to regulate the industry. Interstate
calls—calls from an incarcerated person in one state to a recipient in another
state—constitute only a tiny fraction of the total number of calls from prisons and
jails.83 Local calls—those made and received within the same state—make up
roughly 80% of calls.84 So, beyond the dramatic cut in the cost of calls, these rate
caps represented a significant change in the legal landscape of the prison telecom
industry.
However, these rate caps were immediately challenged before they could go
into effect.85 The providers (along with several state and local corrections agencies)
claimed that, by capping both local and long-distance calls, the FCC had
overstepped its authority to regulate interstate communications.86 While the

Reform
of
Prison
Phone
Industry
(Dec.
14,
2013),
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2013/dec/15/fcc-order-heralds-hope-for-reform-of-prisonphone-industry/ (discussing reaction to the regulation).
79. Press Release, FCC, FCC Takes Next Big Steps in Reducing Inmate Calling Rates (Oct. 22, 2015),
https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-takes-next-big-steps-reducing-inmate-calling-rates.
80. Id.
81. Beth Schwartzapfel, The FCC Looks into the Prison Telephone Racket, MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct.
22, 2015, 1:39 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/12/04/the-fcc-looks-into-the-prisontelephone-racket.
82. Id.; FCC, Press Release, FCC Takes Next Big Steps In Reducing Inmate Calling Rates (Oct. 22,
2015), https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-takes-next-big-steps-reducing-inmate-calling-rates.
83. Federal Communications Commission Washington, Letter to President of NARUC (on file at
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-365619A1.pdf) (discussing that 80% of calls are
intrastate).
84. Id.
85. David Shepardson, Court Blocks Immediate FCC Rate Cut for U.S. Prisoner Telephone Calls,
REUTERS (Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-telecoms-prison/court-blocksimmediate-fcc-rate-cut-for-u-s-prisoner-telephone-calls-idUSKCN0W92CK.
86. See Glob. Tel Link v. FCC, 866 F.3d 397, 401–02 (D.C. Cir. 2017); see also Global Tel Link, Global
Tel Link Expresses Grave Concern with Proposed FCC Decision on Inmate Calling Services, PR NEWSWIRE
(Oct. 22, 2015), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/global-tellink-expresses-grave-concernwith-proposed-fcc-decision-on-inmate-calling-services-300164830.html (condemning the regulations as
“disastrously short-sighted).

646

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

VOL. 57

Commission initially aggressively defended the legality of these caps,87 the agency’s
stance changed dramatically after the 2016 presidential election. Then President
Donald J. Trump appointed Ajit Pai—a former lobbyist for the prison telecom
industry88 and vocal opponent of the FCC’s previous regulations 89—as the Chairman
of the FCC.90 Within weeks of his appointment, the FCC announced that it would no
longer defend the rate caps in court because “the current Commission does not
believe that the agency has the authority” to implement them. 91
Unsurprisingly, this move doomed the FCC’s regulations. In 2017, the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit struck down the caps on local phone calls and vacated
many of the proposed reforms.92 The Court concluded that the FCC did not have
the authority to impose rate caps on purely intrastate phone calls, even if they were
unfairly priced.93 After the GTL decision, Democrat legislators introduced several
bills intended to explicitly grant the FCC authority over local phone calls.94 These
efforts gained renewed urgency in the movement due to both the pandemic and
the surge of protests following the killings of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and
other Black and Brown people in 2020.95 To date, Congress has yet to pass any
legislation specifically addressing the cost of calls for incarcerated people. 96
The GTL decision remains a significant hurdle for any FCC regulation today.
Without the ability to regulate local calls, the FCC cannot touch the vast majority of

87. Shepardson, supra note 85 (quoting an FCC filing as saying that the regulations were a “firmly
grounded exercise of the FCC’s statutory authority”).
88. Carrie Wilkinson, FCC Chairman Called Out on Conflict of Interest Concerning Prison Phone
Company, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2017/aug/30/fccchairman-called-out-conflict-interest-concerning-prison-phone-company/.
89. See, e.g., Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services, 30 FCC Rcd. 12,763, 12,960 (2015)
(Comm’r Ajit Pai, dissenting); Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services, 28 FCC Rcd. 14,107, 14,218
(2013) (Comm’r Ajit Pai, dissenting).
90. Press Release, FCC, Statement of Ajit Pai on Being Designated FCC Chairman by President
Trump (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.fcc.gov/document/statement-ajit-pai-being-designated-chairmanpresident-trump.
91. See Glob. Tel Link, 866 F.3d at 406; see also Cecilia Kang, Court Strikes Obama-Era Rule Capping
Cost
of
Phone
Calls
from
Prison,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
13,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/technology/fcc-prison-phone-calls-regulations.html
(noting
that the agency switched positions after Pai became Chairman).
92. Cecilia Kang, Court Strikes Obama-Era Rule Capping Cost of Phone Calls from Prison, N.Y. TIMES
(June
13,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/technology/fcc-prison-phone-callsregulations.html; see also Glob. Tel Link, 866 F.3d at 403.
93. Glob. Tel Link, 866 F.3d at 410 (rejecting the “conclusion that § 276 authorizes the Commission
to cap intrastate rates pursuant to ‘just, reasonable and fair’ ratemaking.”).; NELSON ET AL., supra note 18,
at 39.
94. S. 1764, 116th Cong. (2019).
95. Rachel M. Cohen, Senators Push for Free Prison Calls in Next Coronavirus Relief Bill, INTERCEPT
(Aug. 7, 2020, 11:43 AM), https://theintercept.com/2020/08/07/prison-phone-calls-coronavirus-reliefbill/ (noting that protests brought increased focus on conditions in jails and prisons).
96. Id. (discussing obstacles to the bill in congress).
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the industry. In September 2020, the FCC announced that it was lowering the cost
of long-distance calls, while reaffirming the Commission’s belief in the validity of
the GTL decision by calling on state regulators to take action on local calls.97
However, after the 2020 election, it is possible that a new FCC Commissioner could
renew the agency’s efforts to extend its authority over all calls from correctional
facilities.
Regulation at the state and local level remains inconsistent. Very few states
have passed meaningful regulation of the industry.98 A handful of states, like Illinois,
have passed rate caps for calls from state prisons, while leaving the cost of calls
from jails untouched.99 In the past few years, some cities and counties have sought
to lower the cost of calls as an issue of racial justice. For instance, New York City
and San Francisco have all passed laws to provide free or low-cost calls to people in
jail,100 while Dallas renegotiated its contract to charge less than one cent per
minute, after a campaign by activists.101
B. Prison Telecom Litigation
Like regulators and legislators, courts have also failed to exercise meaningful
oversight over the prison telecom industry. A mix of statutes and common law ideas
at the federal and state level create difficulties for plaintiffs attempting to hold the
industry accountable in court. Judges have long declared that prison telecom
corporations, unlike many other actors in correctional facilities, cannot be sued for
constitutional violations, blocking the vast majority of claims. 102 Federal law also
97. Rebecca Boone, FCC Asks States to Lower the Cost of In-State Inmate Calls, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Sept.
22,
2020),
https://apnews.com/article/ajit-pai-idaho-prisons5dff229e977acc11c8926cb2f82fe713.
98. Omari Sankofa II & Angie Jackson, Detroit Pistons Owner Tom Gores Speaks About Controversy
Over
Securus,
DETROIT
FREE
PRESS
(Feb.
6,
2021,
3:45
PM),
https://www.freep.com/story/sports/nba/pistons/2021/02/04/tom-gores-detroit-pistons-securusprison-phone-calls/4139871001/ (noting that the industry is unregulated in Michigan); see also Timothy
Williams, The High Cost of Calling The Imprisoned, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/31/us/steep-costs-of-inmate-phone-calls-are-under-scrutiny.html
(discussing how prison telecom is “largely unregulated”).
99. See, e.g., Carrie Wilkinson, Family Connections Bill Signed into Law in Illinois, PRISON LEGAL NEWS
(Sept. 2, 2016), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2016/sep/2/family-connections-bill-signedlaw-illinois/.
100. Lauren Johnson, New York is the First Major City to Allow Free Calls from Jail, CNN (May 1,
2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/01/us/free-calls-from-jail-nyc-trnd/index.html; Press Release,
Office of the Mayor London N. Breed, San Francisco Announces All Phone Calls from County Jails Are
Now Free (Aug. 10, 2020), https://sfmayor.org/article/san-francisco-announces-all-phone-calls-countyjails-are-now-free.
101. Steven Young, Dallas County Drops Jail Phone Calls to $.01 per Minute, DALLAS OBSERVER (Feb.
19,
2020),
https://www.dallasobserver.com/news/dallas-countys-jail-phone-calls-now-amongcheapest-in-us-11873772.
102. See discussion supra Section II.B.i.
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does not create a viable cause of action, and FCC regulations do not create a cause
of action either.103 Although some plaintiffs have brought successful tort actions in
state courts, these victories have been infrequent.104 The result is that prison
telecom corporations can act with impunity.
i. Litigation in Federal Courts and Why It Fails
Historically, advocates have not had much success using federal statutes to
challenge the prison telecom industry.105 There have been a few attempts to file
suit under the Communications Act requirement that rates be “just and
reasonable,” but judges have generally referred any challenge involving the cost of
phone calls to the FCC, which has historically waited years before acting on the
claims.106 As a result, many suits brought under federal law are never even heard
by a judge.
Federal law does technically allow people to file claims against prison telecom
corporations, but other doctrines effectively limit their use. In theory, the
Communications Act of 1934 provides consumers with a private right of action to
sue telecom providers that do not provide “just and reasonable” telephone rates. 107
Indeed, the Wright plaintiffs brought claims under the Communications Act, in
addition to other constitutional and anti-trust claims.108
However, a set of common law doctrines prevents most of these suits from
being heard in court, instead transferring them to the FCC. The first concept is the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which allows a court to refer claims to an
administrative agency if a claim falls within their area of expertise.109 For instance,
in the Wright case, the judge refused to hear the claims under the Communications
Act because the FCC had primary jurisdiction over the review of the cost of

103. See discussion supra Section II.B.i.
104. See, e.g., Jon Reid, Securus Won’t Record California Prisoner Calls, Under Settlement,
BLOOMBERG LAW (June 17, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/tech-and-telecom-law/securus-wontrecord-california-prisoner-calls-under-settlement.
105. See, e.g., McNeil v. Glob. Tel-Link, No. 3:15-cv-01243 2017 WL 5248377 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 13,
2017) (dismissing claim brought under Federal Communications Act); Smith v. Securus Techs., Inc., 120
F. Supp. 3d 976, 88 (D. Minn. 2015) (dismissing claims brought under the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act).
106. ARIEL NELSON, BRIAN HIGHSMITH, ALEX KORNYA, & STEPHEN RAHER, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER
COMMERCIALIZED (IN)JUSTICE LITIGATION GUIDE: APPLYING CONSUMER LAWS TO COMMERCIAL BAIL, PRISON RETAIL, AND
PRIVATE
DEBT
COLLECTION
38–39
(2020),
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/criminaljustice/WP_Litigation_Guide.pdf, (noting that the FCC waited ten years to act on the Wright Petition and
has been “slow to issue new rules” afterwards).
107. 47 U.S.C. § 206 (stating that providers that violate the Act “shall be liable to the person or
persons injured” for money damages); 47 U.S.C. § 207 (allowing individuals harmed by violations of the
Act to bring suit in federal district court).
108. Martha Wright v. Corrections Corporation of America, CTR. FOR CONST. RIGHTS (Oct. 22, 2007),
https://ccrjustice.org/home/what-we-do/our-cases/martha-wright-v-corrections-corporation-america.
109. Bryson Santaguida, The Primary Jurisdiction Two-Step, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1517 (2007).
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interstate phone calls.110 The plaintiffs then had to navigate a years-long FCC
mediation process that concluded without a settlement, before proceeding to file
a petition for the FCC to issue new regulations. 111
A second common law idea, the filed rate doctrine, performs a similar
function. Utility providers, including telephone companies, are required to submit
their rates to government regulators, who are then responsible for ensuring that
consumers actually pay the posted rate.112 The filed rate doctrine prevents
consumers from claiming that a rate is unreasonable if that rate is on file with a
regulator.113 Although advocates have argued that the filed rate doctrine should not
apply to prison telecom industry, courts continue to dismiss claims that challenge
the reasonableness of telephone rates.114
ii. Constitutional Claims
Similarly, constitutional claims against prison telecom corporations at the
federal level are usually unsuccessful. Although constitutional litigation is
responsible for some dramatic reforms of the U.S. prison system, courts have
largely rejected constitutional claims against prison telecom corporations. 115 Most
of these suits, brought under Section 1983, die at the hands of the “state actor”
doctrine.116 Further, many judges have simply concluded that there is no
constitutional right to telephone calls.117 As a result, successful constitutional
litigation against prison telecom corporations is basically non-existent.
110. Ben Iddings, Big Disconnect: Will Anyone Answer the Call to Lower Excessive Prisoner
Telephone Rates, 8 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 159, 191 (2006).
111. Martha Wright, supra note 73.
112. See Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cent. Office Tel., 524 U.S. 214, 22 (1998) (internal citations omitted).
113. NELSON ET AL., supra note 17, at 66 (citing Carlin v. DairyAmerica, Inc., 705 F.3d 856, 867 (9th
Cir. 2013)) (“At its most basic, the filed-rate doctrine provides that state law, and some federal law (e.g.
antitrust law), may not be used to invalidate a filed-rate nor to assume a rate would be charged other
than the rate adopted by the federal agency in question.”).
114. See, e.g., Alexander v. Glob. Tel Link Corp., No. 3:17cv560-LG-RHW, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
147303, at *16 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 29, 2019).
115. See, e.g., Susan P. Sturm, The Legacy and Future of Corrections Litigation, 142 U. PA. L. REV.
639,
662
(1993),
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3602&context=penn_law_review
(concluding that litigation has led to “standards of minimally adequate treatment” of incarcerated
people).
116. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Securus Techs., No. 3:19-CV-00433-GNS-RSE, 2020 WL 3343000, at
*7 (W.D. Ky. June 18, 2020) (concluding that prison telecom providers are not state actors under Section
1983); Pierce v. Kalamazoo Cty. Jail, No. 1:14-CV-684, 2014 WL 5599693, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 3, 2014
(same); Breland v. Evercom Sys., No. 7:09-CV-60-HL, 2009 WL 1490488, at *1 (M.D. Ga. May 27, 2009)
(same).
117. See, e.g., Combs v. Stevens, No. 1:16CV9 RLW, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 27, 2016) (“Plaintiff's
claim that he was denied free phone calls does not state a plausible claim under § 1983 because inmates
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Constitutional litigation is particularly important for people behind bars. By
turning to federal courts, incarcerated people and advocates have won court orders
that lead to significant changes in the legal landscape for incarcerated people. 118
Some victories have led to significant tools for incarcerated people to expose the
inhumane conditions, like Bivens, which opened the door to federal claims for
money damages against certain types of officials. 119 Other lawsuits have led to
symbolic statements of the human rights of incarcerated people, like the Supreme
Court’s decision in Estelle v. Gamble, now a fundamental piece of the Supreme
Court’s 8th Amendment jurisprudence and the prisoners’ rights movement alike.120
Unsurprisingly, the vast majority of lawsuits filed by incarcerated people are
based on constitutional claims.121 Constitutional claims have historically been one
of the most common– if still immensely difficult and time consuming– avenues to
receive money damages for rights violations.122 In addition, legal advocates often
produce materials that focus on constitutional claims above statutory or state-level
remedies.123 Presumably, these materials are easier to standardize to a broader
audience and simpler to explain than complex state statutes and causes of action.
Perhaps because of these materials, many incarcerated people have
attempted to file constitutional claims against prison telecom corporations or
against correctional agencies that work with them.124 These have almost been
uniformly unsuccessful.125 In fact, the vast majority of them are dismissed at the
screening stage that every incarcerated plaintiff must overcome before they can
even make it into federal court.126

do not have a constitutional right to free phone calls.”); Sensabaugh v. Poff, No. 7:10-cv-00482, at *2
(W.D. Va. Nov. 1, 2010) (“Plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed as frivolous because he does not have
a constitutional right to make free calls.”).
118. See, e.g., Susan P. Sturm, The Legacy and Future of Corrections Litigation, 142 U. PA. L. REV.
639, 662 (1993) (concluding that litigation has led to “standards of minimally adequate treatment” of
incarcerated people).
119. See, e.g., James E. Pfander, The Story of Bivens v. Six Unknown-Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics (Nw. Univ. Sch. of L., Faculty Working Paper No. 189, 2009),
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1188&context=facultyw
orkingpapers.
120. See, e.g., Jonathan Rosenfeld, The Origin of Prisoner's Rights: Estelle v. Gamble 429 U.S. 97;
75-929 (1976), NAT’L L. REV. (Sept. 16, 2016).
121. See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1575 (2003) (explaining that
incarcerated people file federal civil suits thirty-five times more frequently than the general population).
122. Id. at 1573 n. 52.
123. See, e.g., CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS & NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, THE JAILHOUSE LAWYER’S
HANDBOOK: HOW TO BRING A FEDERAL LAWSUIT TO CHALLENGE VIOLATIONS OF YOUR RIGHTS IN PRISON (5th Ed. 2010),
https://ccrjustice.org/files/Report_JailHouseLawyersHandbook.pdf.
124. See, e.g., Henneberg v. Securus Corr. Servs., No. 20-cv-00223-JPG, 2020 WL 4365472, at *1
(S.D. Ill. Jul. 30, 2020).
125. See Rosenfeld, supra note 120.
126. See, e.g., McNeil v. Glob. Tel-Link, No. 3:15-cv-01243, 2017 WL 5248377, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Nov.
9, 2018).
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IV. THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE: WHY CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS FAIL
Federal judges have dismissed these claims for two key reasons. First, many
have concluded that private telecom corporations cannot be sued in constitutional
suits because they are not state actors. Second, even when suits are allowed to
proceed, judges have quickly concluded that there is no constitutional right to
cheap telephone calls.
Most incarcerated people that file lawsuits do so bring suits in federal court.127
Many of these claims are “Section 1983” claims,128 which allow people to win
money damages for claims of federal rights violations perpetuated by state
actors.129 These claims are usually said to have two elements: first, there must be a
deprivation of a right created by the Constitution or another federal law, and
second, the deprivation must be made under color of state law. 130 This second
element usually poses the problem for people trying to sue prison telecom
corporations.
To date, the Supreme Court has repeatedly interpreted the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause to protect against constitutional infringements
by state actors.131 On the other hand, the Court has generally refused to extend this
protection against so-called “private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or
wrongful.”132 However, private parties can find themselves liable for constitutional
violations if the rights violations are “fairly attributable to the State” because the
private party is acting while “clothed with the authority of state law.” 133
Even by Supreme Court standards, the Court’s decisions on this issue have
been particularly vague and, at times, contradictory. 134 As a result, circuit courts
have relied on a number of different tests to determine what constitutes state
action. In general, however, courts apply four tests: the state compulsion test, the
public function test, the nexus test, and the joint action test. 135

127. See Schlanger, supra note 121, at 1573 n.52 (estimating that about 25% of lawsuits filed by
incarcerated people are in state court).
128. See Taylor Van Hove, Fraud, Mistake and, Section 1983 Prison Claims: Why the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and Section Should Be Amended to Require Heightened Pleading for Section 1983
Inmate Litigation, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 213, 228 n.149 (2016).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
130. See generally Jack M. Beermann, Common Law Elements of the Section 1983 Action, 72 CHI.KENT L. REV. 695 (1997).
131. See, e.g., Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49–50 (1999).
132. Id. at 50.
133. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317–18 (1981) (citations omitted).
134. See Martin A. Schwartz & Erwin Chemerinsky, Dialogue on State Action, 16 TOURO C. L. REV.
775, 80 (2016) (identifying “inconsistencies in the decisions that the Supreme Court has never
resolved”); see also Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 US 374, 378 (1995).
135. Schwartz & Chemerinsky, supra note 134, at 798; David M. Howard, Rethinking State
Inaction: An In-Depth Look at the State Action Doctrine in State and Lower Federal Courts, 16 CONN. PUB.
INT. L.J. 221, 227 (2017).
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The state compulsion test finds state action if a state law or policy requires a
private party to undertake a certain action.136 Significantly, courts have concluded
that compulsion requires an “significant encouragement,” beyond a private party
complying with a state regulatory scheme, no matter how detailed.137 Rather, the
state must compel the private party to take a certain action, not just react to their
actions.138 For instance, in Blum v. Yerestky, the Supreme Court held that there was
no state action when New York lowered Medicaid benefits for nursing home
residents that were transferred to lower levels of care. 139 In the Court’s view, there
was no compulsion because the state merely adjusted the benefits in response to
the decision of the residents’ physicians—who were private parties. 140
Another potential test is the public function test, which asks whether a private
party performing a function that is “traditionally and exclusively” reserved to the
state.141 Although this test would appear to encompass a wide range of government
functions that, under a common sense view, are traditional and exclusive, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly sought to limit this category.142 In the prison context,
this narrow focus has led to head-scratching decisions by circuit courts that rely on
strained dives into historical records. For instance, in Holly v. Scott, the Fourth
Circuit declared that “the operation of prisons is not a ‘public function,’” citing
examples of private individuals operating prisons in the 19th century. 143
The third option, the nexus test, seeks to determine whether there is a
“sufficiently close nexus” between a private party and the state, such that the
private party’s actions can be considered state actions.144 Some circuit courts
consider a fourth test, the joint participant test, that asks whether state and the
private parties are so interdependent that they should be recognized as “joint
participant[s]” in the alleged rights violation.145 Like the state compulsion test, this
test requires courts to embark on a highly fact-specific “totality of the

136. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982); Howard, supra note 135, at 232; Julie K. Brown,
Less Is More: Decluttering the State Action Doctrine, 73 MO. L. REV. 561, 565 (2008).
137. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 1974 (concluding that the “mere fact
that a business is subject to state regulation does not by itself convert its action into that of the State,”
even if the regulation is “extensive and detailed”).
138. Barba Rook Snyder, Private Motivation, State Action, and the Allocation of Responsibility for
Fourteenth Amendment Violations, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1053, 1065 (1990).
139. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1011.
140. Megan M. Cooper, Note, Dusting Off the Old Play Book: How the Supreme Court Disregarded
the Blum Trilogy, Returned to Theories of the Past, and Found State Action through Entwinement in
Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 913, 945 (2001).
141. See Brown, supra note 136, at 565; see also San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic
Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
142. See Brown, supra note 136, at 565.
143. Holly v. Scott, 434 F.3d 287, 293 (4th Cir. 2006); see also Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S.
399, 405 (1997).
144. Howard, supra note 135, at 230.
145. See, e.g., Gorenc v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 869 F.2d 503, 507
(9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961)).
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circumstances” analysis.146 For instance, in West v. Atkins, the Supreme Court held
that a contract physician working in a state prison was a state actor because the
state had authorized him to be the exclusive provider of medical care to
incarcerated people.147 The West court noted that the physician’s contract or
nature of his employment was irrelevant—it is the function that is key.148
Many Section 1983 suits brought against prison telecom corporations have
been dismissed under the “state actor” doctrine.149 Many of these lawsuits are filed
pro se by incarcerated people without the help of an attorney. 150 Although judges
ostensibly provide more leeway to pro se plaintiffs,151 they have repeatedly
dismissed cases against prison telecom corporations at the earliest stage for a
failure to provide a detailed analysis of the state actor doctrine.152 These dismissals
show why this doctrine, above all else, is the fundamental obstacle to constitutional
litigation against the prison telecom industry.
These claims have been dismissed, even when they have alleged seemingly
clear-cut instances of unfair or illegal behavior on the part of the corporations. In
Brooks v. Securustech.net, an incarcerated person attempted to sue corrections
officials in Suffolk County, New York, as well as Securus, the jail’s telecom vendor. 153
According to the complaint, Securus charged rates as high as $5.00 for a 15 minute
phone call, frequently disconnected callers before their time was up, and charged
“outrageous” fees.154 The plaintiff alleged a number of different constitutional
claims.155 First, the complaint claimed that, as a result of the costs, people had no
contact with the outside world, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 156 The
complaint also alleged that the dropped calls and flawed system violated the due
process rights of pre-trial detainees by preventing them from preparing an
adequate defense with their attorneys.157
Applying the “nexus” test for state action, a federal judge dismissed the case
with prejudice.158 The judge simply noted that Securus was a privately-held

146. Howard, supra note 135, at 229.
147. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 55 (1988).
148. Id. at 56.
149. See Montgomery, 2020 WL 3343000, at *7 (collecting cases) (citations omitted).
150. See, e.g., Lockridge v. Sumner Cnty. Jail, No. 3:18-cv-01364, 2019 WL 1028002, at *4 (M.D.
Tenn. Mar. 4, 2019) (dismissing case filed pro se); Breland v. Evercom System, Inc., No. 7:09-cv-60, 2009
WL 1490488, at *1 (M.D. Ga. May 27, 2009) (dismissing case filed pro se).
151. See generally Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
152. See, e.g., Montgomery, 2020 WL 3343000, at *4 (listing cases).
153. Brooks v. SecurusTech.net, No. 13-CV-4646(JS)(AKT), 2014 WL 737683, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb.
24, 2014).
154. Id. at *2–3.
155. Id.
156. Id. at *2.
157. Id. at *2–3.
158. Id. at 15, 19.
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corporation, citing business information on the company’s website. 159 The court
then concluded that, as a private corporation, Securus was not a state actor, even
if it had a contract with Suffolk County or was regulated by the state. 160 This
decision, with its bare reasoning and failure to actually explore the facts of the case,
is emblematic of the caselaw in this area.
V. WHY PRISON TELECOM CORPORATIONS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED STATE
ACTORS
However, these decisions are legally flawed and rely on many different faulty
assumptions about how the prison telecom industry works. Even under the
Supreme Court’s existing murky definition of the term, prison telecom corporations
qualify as state actors. The decisions in these cases demonstrate that federal judges
are just as susceptible to being fooled by corporate talking points as anyone else.
In reality, the prison telecom industry is deeply enmeshed with correctional
agencies.
A. Prison telecom corporations assist law enforcement agencies with prosecution
and rights violations by recording phone calls, performing biometric
surveillance, and phone tapping attorneys.
Prison telecom corporations are not neutral vendors that merely provide a
utility to the state. In reality, they wield an enormously powerful set of surveillance
technology that law enforcement officials have frequently used to support the
prosecution of criminal defendants and punish incarcerated people. And—
unsurprisingly, given the complete lack of industry oversight—prison telecom
corporations have repeatedly used these tools to violate the constitutional rights
of incarcerated people and their families. In effect, they have become an arm of law
enforcement.
Prison telecom corporations have recently begun to offer recording and
monitoring as part of their telephone services. For instance, Securus’ “Secure Call
Platform” claims to monitor every single call made from a correctional agency to
outside parties.161 These recordings are then stored on a server, where law
enforcement officials can access them.162 Police officers and detectives can use
these recordings as vital pieces of evidence in criminal investigations and
prosecutions of both the caller and recipient of these calls. 163 Through these tools,
159. Brooks, 2014 WL 737683, at *15 n.5.
160. Id. at *16.
161. Jordan Smith & Micah Lee, Not So Securus, INTERCEPT (Nov. 11, 2015, 10:43 AM),
https://theintercept.com/2015/11/11/securus-hack-prison-phone-company-exposes-thousands-ofcalls-lawyers-and-clients/.
162. See Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Service Meant to Monitor Inmates’ Calls Could Track You,
Too, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/10/technology/cellphone-trackinglaw-enforcement.html.
163. See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 2020 Ill. App Ct. 3d 180458-U, ¶¶ 30–32, 44 (Ill. App. Ct. Sept.
10, 2020) (upholding conviction based on introduction of recorded jail phone calls).
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prison telecom corporations have enmeshed themselves into one of the
quintessential government functions: prosecuting and incarcerating people
accused of crimes.164
Prison telecom corporations like Securus have also repeatedly recorded
privileged and confidential conversations between incarcerated individuals and
their attorneys—and have also provided this ostensibly confidential material to
prosecutors.165 Securus alone has paid millions of dollars in settlements and fines
to settle these allegations,166 which the corporation claims occurred as a result of a
software glitch. But the frequency with which these recordings occurred —
thousands of calls across many different states 167— belies any claim that this an
innocent mistake. When viewed as a whole, it suggests that the industry plays a
crucial role in systemic rights violations that may have impacted countless criminal
cases.
The industry also provides surveillance tools that provide warrantless
surveillance of anyone who receives a call from an incarcerated person. Securus,
through a deal with major cellphone carriers, allowed law enforcement officials to
track the locations of any cellphone that received a call from a correctional
agency.168 Securus provided this information to any officer that claimed to have a
warrant and did not actually verify the legality of these searches. 169 In early 2020,
the Federal Communications Commission proposed $200 million in fines for

164. See Daniel Rudofsky, Modern State Action Doctrine in The Age of Big Data, 71 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 741, 754 (2017), https://annualsurveyofamericanlaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/714_rudofsky.pdf; Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding state action
where police delegated authority to private security to detain individuals, issue citations, and access
police records); see also Lusby v. T.G.& Y. Stores, 749 F.2d 1423, 1430 (10th Cir. 1984) (finding state
action where private security was given authority to make arrests and “substitute his judgment for that
of the police”).
165. Tonya Riley, A Private Prison Company Gave 1,300 Recordings of Confidential Inmate Phone
Calls to Prosecutors, MOTHER JONES (June 8, 2018), https://www.motherjones.com/crimejustice/2018/06/securus-corecivic-kansas-prison-phone-calls/.
166. See, e.g., Maeve Allsup, Inmates, Attorneys Settle California Prison Call Recording Suit,
BLOOMBERG L. (June 17, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/inmates-attorneys-settlecalifornia-prison-call-recording-suit.
167. Riley, supra note 165; Tim Cushing, Another Prison Phone Service Caught Recording
Privileged Conversations and Passing Them on to Law Enforcement, TECHDIRT (Aug. 24, 2018),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20180822/08151040483/another-prison-phone-service-caughtrecording-privileged-conversations-passing-them-to-law-enforcement.shtml; Jordan Smith, Securus
Settles Lawsuit Alleging Improper Recording of Privileged Prisoner Calls, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Sept. 2,
2016), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2016/sep/2/securus-settles-lawsuit-alleging-improperrecording-privileged-prisoner-calls/.
168. Valentino-DeVries, supra note 162.
169. Valentino-DeVries, supra note 162 (quoting a letter written by Senator Ron Wyden as saying
that “Securus confirmed that it did not ‘conduct any review of surveillance requests’”).
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cellphone carriers’ role in the scheme, but Securus escaped without a scratch. 170
And what’s more, there has been no accounting of how many people had their
rights casually violated by the industry.171
Finally, the industry also expanded into Orwellian surveillance of people’s
voices. Using technology developed using Department of Defense funds, the
industry has developed tools to create a “voice print” of anyone using a correctional
telephone system.172 In states like New York, nearly every incarcerated person is
forced to submit to this biometric surveillance in order to access the phones.173
Telecom corporations provide this data to law enforcement officials, who retain
voice prints even after people are released from incarceration. 174 Even worse, this
biometric surveillance is also turned against people who simply receive calls from
an incarcerated loved one, without a warrant or even a suspicion that they are
involved in criminal activity.175
This mass surveillance alone puts telecom providers into the realm of a state
action. By flagging “suspicious” calls, collecting evidence of supported wrongdoing,
and organizing it for detectives, prison telecom corporations are engaging in much
of the day-to-day work of law enforcement. In some respects, it even appears that
correctional officials are simply outsourcing law enforcement to private vendors.
By acting as law enforcement—a quintessential public function—prison telecom
corporations have become state actors. Further the joint nature of the information
sharing, where corrections officers can freely access information surreptitiously
gathered by private corporations, suggests a further degree of state action.

170. Jon Brodkin, FCC Issues Wrist-Slap Fines to Carriers that Sold your Phone-Location Data,
ARSTECHNICA (Feb. 28, 2020, 3:06 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2020/02/fcc-issues-wristslap-fines-to-carriers-that-sold-your-phone-location-data/.
171. Statement of Commissioner Geoffrey Starks Approving in Part and Dissenting in Part, AT&T
Inc., FCC 20-26, No. EB-TCD-18-00027704 (Feb. 28, 2020), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC20-26A5.pdf) (noting that, even after the investigation “the Commission still has no idea how many
consumers' data was mishandled by each of the carriers”).
172. David Grossman, Prisons Are Building Giant Biometric Databases of Prisoners' Voices,
POPULAR
MECHANICS
(Feb.
1,
2019),
https://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/security/a26112865/us-biometric-voice-archivesprisoners/.
173. George Joseph & Debbie Nathan, Prisons Across the U.S. Are Quietly Building Databases of
Incarcerated
People’s
Voice
Prints,
INTERCEPT
(Jan.
30,
2019,
9:00
AM),
https://theintercept.com/2019/01/30/prison-voice-prints-databases-securus/.
174. George Joseph & Debbie Nathan, Prison Tech Company Is Questioned for Retaining ‘Voice
Prints’ of People Presumed Innocent, APPEAL (Feb. 12, 2019) https://theappeal.org/jails-across-the-u-sare-extracting-the-voice-prints-of-people-presumed-innocent/ (finding recordings can be stored of
individuals “even if charges are dropped or they are found not guilty”); Worth Rises supra note 15, at 46
(discussing how a “person’s voice print lives long beyond their incarceration”).
175. Joseph & Nathan, supra note 174.
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B. Prison telecom corporations shape corrections policies and regulations through
bidding, lobbying, and influence.
While corrections agencies set contract terms through request for proposals
(RFPs),176 the prison telecom industry is not a passive vendor of services that simply
acquiesces to government requests.177 Rather, corporations have taken an
increasingly influential role in dictating correctional policy. The industry exercises
its power throughout the bidding process and contractual negotiations, 178 as well
as through direct lobbying,179 and informal influence.180 In the past few years alone,
the industry has succeeded in persuading corrections officials in adopting policies
that drive more revenue to corporations, at an immense cost to the people forced
to use their products: incarcerated people and their families. 181
Prison telecom corporations have used contract negotiations to demand that
corrections agencies implement sweeping changes to their policies. The most
dramatic example of this can be seen in video calls, an increasingly important
source of revenue for prison telecom corporations. 182 The industry first rebranded
video calls as “video visitation,” seeking to push the service—comparable to a
stripped down version of Skype or Zoom—as a replacement for in person visits at

176. See generally Peter Wagner & Alexi Jones, Best Practices for Phone RFPs, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE (Jan. 14, 2021), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/phones/rfp_guidance.html.
177. Peter Wagner & Alexi Jones, State of Phone Justice, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Feb. 2019),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/phones/state_of_phone_justice.html (discussing “bundled contracts,”
where providers offer phone service combined with other tools to “hid[e] the real costs of each service”
and “make[] it more difficult for the facility to change vendors in the future”).
178. See, e.g., Bianca Tylek & Connor McCleskey, This Call May be Monopolized and Recorded,
MARSHALL PROJECT (July 11, 2018) https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/07/11/this-call-may-bemonopolized-and-recorded.
179. See Private Prison Phone Companies Lobbied for Criminalization of Cell Phones in Prisons,
EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (Feb. 8, 2016), https://eji.org/news/private-companies-lobbied-to-criminalize-cellphones-in-prisons/.
180. For instance, LEO Technologies, a telecom corporation that creates call-monitoring
technology, appointed the former head of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(CDCR) as President and CEO just weeks after he retired from his position at CDCR. See Press Release,
LEO Technologies Names Former California Department of Corrections Secretary as President and CEO,
LEO Techs (Sept. 10, 2019), https://leotechnologies.com/leo-technologies-names-ceo/; Press Release,
CDCR Secretary Scott Kernan Retiring, New Leadership Team Announced, Cal. Dept. of Corrs. and Rehab.
(Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/news/2018/08/14/cdcr-secretary-scott-kernan-retiring-newleadership-team-announced/.
181. See, e.g., Worth Rises, supra note 15, at 49 (describing “burgeoning products” with
“exorbitant price tags” that prison telecom corporations have marketed in the past decade).
182. Nicole Lewis & Beatrix Lockwood, Can You Hear Me Now?, MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 19, 2019),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/12/19/can-you-hear-me-now
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facilities.183 Then, for years, corporations like Securus actually required facilities to
end in person visits altogether as part of their contracts.184
By inserting these clauses into its contracts, Securus used its market power to
dramatically curtail incarcerated individuals access to their loved ones. Although
Securus never accepted responsibility for the practice, advocates found that as
many as 70% of Securus contracts, covering hundreds of facilities, had contained
clauses like “Customer will eliminate all face to face visitation.” 185 And corrections
agencies agreed, in exchange for a cut of the revenue generated by these new
“video visits.”186 The practice only ended in 2015, after widespread outrage forced
the corporation to backtrack.187 Even when corporations do not force facilities to
end in-person visits, nearly three-quarters of facilities with video calling decrease in
person visitation.188
Through these restrictions, the industry is able to influence the day-to-day
operation of prisons and jails, affecting something as essential as human contact
for incarcerated individuals. And, while there is no constitutional right to in-person
visits, courts have repeatedly found that state regulations around visitation can
create a liberty interest for people affected by them. 189 Thus, the industry’s
practices during contract negotiations could have potentially led corrections
agencies to violate the due process rights of incarcerated people. Beyond the
industry’s power in contractual negotiations, corporations also benefit from a
revolving door between corrections agencies and the private sector. Most notably,
Ajit Pai, the former chairman of the FCC, represented Securus as a lobbyist in
2011.190 Then, just a year later, he was appointed as a Commissioner of the FCC. 191
Throughout his tenure, Pai’s FCC repeatedly implemented policies that benefitted

183. See generally Patrice A. Fulcher, The Double-Edged Sword of Prison Video Visitation: Claiming
to Keep Families Together While Furthering the Aims of the Prison Industrial Complex, 9 Fl. A&M U.L. REV.
83, 92 (2013).
184. Bernadette Rabuy, Securus Ends its Ban on In-Person Visits, Shifts Responsibility to Sheriffs,
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (May 6, 2015), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2015/05/06/securus-endsban/.
185. Id.
186. See Bernadette Rabuy & Peter Wagner, Screening Out Family Time, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE 14
(Jan. 2015), https://static.prisonpolicy.org/visitation/ScreeningOutFamilyTime_January2015.pdf (listing
different commission rates for major providers).
187. Securus Ends its Ban on In-Person Visits, Shifts Responsibility to Sheriffs, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE
(May 6, 2015) https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2015/05/06/securus-ends-ban/.
188. Debra Cassens Weiss, Another Jail Eliminates In-Person Visits and Adopts 50-Cent-a-Minute
Video
Visitation,
ABA
J.
(July
24,
2018),
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/another_jail_eliminates_free_in_person_visits_and_adopts
_video_visitation.
189. See, e.g., Patchette v. Nix, 952 F.2d 158 (8th Cir. 1991).
190. Jon Brodkin, Ajit Pai Accused of Conflict for Helping Former Client, a Prison Phone Company,
ARSTECHNICA (Aug. 10, 2017, 2:35 PM), https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/08/ajitpai-accused-of-conflict-for-helping-former-client-a-prison-phone-company/.
191. Id.

2021

PRIVATE PRISON TELECOM CORPORATIONS AND
STATE ACTION: HOW THIS ONE TRICK WILL ALLOW
PLAINTIFFS TO DISRUPT AN $8 BILLION INDUSTRY

659

the industry. In fact, one of his first actions as Commissioner was to refuse to defend
the agency’s prison telephone rate caps in court—effectively dooming a landmark
piece of regulation that advocates had pushed for over decades. 192 Although Pai
would later issue a number of decisions that protected consumers against
monopolization within the industry,193 the appearance of influence had already
been done.
Through contract negotiations and a revolving door of lobbyists, the industry
exerts a significant degree of influence over corrections agencies. Under any test, a
private corporation should qualify as a state actor if it were effectively setting
policies and regulations, like Securus did for years.194 Further, this saga gives the
appearance that both corporations and government agencies worked hand in hand
to decrease visitation for incarcerated people in order to drive up revenue from
commissions. Either way, the line between state and corporation has become
further blurred.
C. Prison telecom corporations return money extracted from incarcerated people
and their families to corrections agencies, funding vital government functions.
Prison telecom corporations most directly support correctional agencies by
providing them with revenue generated from telephone calls through a contractual
kickbacks called “commissions.”195 These commissions are often the single deciding
factor for agencies during the bidding process, and, in some facilities, corporations
have offered corrections agencies up to 96% of the revenues generated from phone
calls.196 At such high rates, commission payments can add up to millions of dollars
a year for many jurisdictions.197 And, many smaller counties have come to rely on
the money generated by prison phone calls to balance their budgets. 198 For
instance, officials in Worcester, Massachusetts pushed back against proposed
legislation to lower the cost of calls, claiming that, if the county could no longer

192. Jon Brodkin, Republican-Led FCC Drops Court Defense of Inmate Calling Rate Cap,
ARSTECHNICA (Feb. 1, 2017, 2:40 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/02/republican-led-fccdrops-court-defense-of-inmate-calling-rate-cap/.
193. See David Shepardson, Inmate Calling Services Companies Drop Merger Bid After U.S.
Regulatory Opposition, REUTERS (Apr. 2, 2019, 4:46 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-fcc-inmatemerger/inmate-calling-services-companies-drop-merger-bid-after-u-s-regulatory-oppositionidUSKCN1RE2L7.
194. See supra discussion note 189.
195. Peter Wagner & Alexi Jones, On Kickbacks and Commissions in the Prison and Jail Phone
Market,
PRISON
POL’Y
INITIATIVE
(Feb.
11,
2019),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2019/02/11/kickbacks-and-commissions/.
196. Letter from Lee G. Petro, Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary,
Federal Communications Commission (Aug. 16, 2014), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/7521772298.pdf.
197. Wagner, On Kickbacks and Commissions, supra note 4.
198. Sarah Betancourt, Costly Connections, COMMONWEALTH MAG. (July 28, 2020),
https://commonwealthmagazine.org/criminal-justice/costly-connections/.
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generate money from prison phone calls, they would have to cut funding for public
mental health programs.199
The prison telecom industry does not just dictate policy—it actually raises
revenue for government agencies through commissions.200 These commissions,
then, shift the burden of paying for essential state services onto incarcerated
people and their families who have already been preyed upon by the state. It also
adds an additional harm, as it makes other core government functions, like mental
health services, dependent on the continued exploitation of the prison telephone
market. This level of funding stretches far beyond just corrections agencies, turning
the prison telecom industry into a reliable source of revenue for many jurisdictions.
D. Corrections agencies write contracts and requests for proposals that often
direct every action of providers.
Although prison telecom corporations exercise enormous influence over the
industry as a whole, corrections agencies control many aspects of the bidding
process itself.201 Like other correctional industries, agencies issue “requests for
proposals” (commonly known as RFPs) that describe a set of services that a facility
requires from a potential telecom vendor. 202 Then, the different prison telecom
corporations bid against each other, often by competing to see who will offer the
most commissions to the agency.203
But, in many jurisdictions, these RFPs lay out the exact terms of the services
that the prison telecom corporations will provide to the facility, removing any
discretion that the corporation may have.204 In these instances, corrections
agencies are not so much as delegating the authority to a private party, they are
simply outsourcing the actual operation of the system to a contractor. With such
rigid requirements, the provision of prison telecom services is not just a purely
private affair. It is a joint action between a state actor and a corporation such that
both are state actors.
VI. LOOKING FORWARD TO A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PHONE CALLS
Of course, the state actor requirement is just one requirement for
constitutional suits.205 Even if courts properly recognized the immense power that
199. Id.
200. See Wagner, On Kickbacks and Commissions, supra note 4.
201. See, e.g., Financing a Jail Supplies and Equipment Company, COMMERCIAL CAPITAL,
https://www.comcapfactoring.com/blog/financing-a-jail-supplies-and-equipment-company/
(last
visited July 13, 2021) (advising prospective contractors how to navigate the bidding process for different
states).
202. Id.
203. See Stephen Raher, The Company Store and the Literally Captive Market: Consumer Law in
Prisons and Jails, 17 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 3, 13 (2020).
204. Peter Wagner & Alexi Jones, Best Practices for Phones RFPs, Prison Policy Initiative (Jan. 14,
2021), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/phones/rfp_guidance.html.
205. See Brooks, 2014 WL 737683, at *15, 19.
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prison telecom corporations have within correctional facilities, incarcerated
plaintiffs would still have to demonstrate some constitutional right to phone access.
But, by refusing to hear most constitutional suits about the industry, courts have
made it unlikely that plaintiffs can ever establish such a right.
Courts have so far declined to find a sweeping constitutional right to
telephone access.206 The core issue for many of these decisions comes down to the
Supreme Court’s conclusion in Turner v. Safley, which held that correctional officials
can infringe upon the constitutional rights of incarcerated people if they can show
that it is “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”207 This incredibly
low bar means that many judges simply defer to any correctional policy.208 Several
federal appellate courts, like the Ninth Circuit, have held that incarcerated people
have at least some right to use the telephone, stemming from the First Amendment
right to communicate with others.209 But, even where judges have accepted the
right to communicate, no circuit court has gone so far as to say that there is a right
to communicate at affordable rates. 210 And, to date, many courts have been
consistently hostile—derisive, even— to the notion of a constitutional right to
affordable phone calls.211
Like with the state actor doctrine, judges may be making these decisions
without a full understanding of how important the telephone is for many
incarcerated people and their families. But, in any event, the concept of a
constitutional right to communicate with others has broad implications that
stretches beyond just the fight for prison phone justice. The movement to end
solitary confinement, for instance, bears a number of similarities to the fight for
affordable phone calls in the courts. They both depend on a recognition of the right
to human contact—a right that judges have so far declined to recognize. 212
VII. CONCLUSION
Prison telecom corporations’ business is exploitation. And, unless there is
drastic legislative reform of the entire industry, families will continue to be forced
to choose between paying exorbitant rates for calls or being isolated from their
incarcerated loved ones. In the absence of this reform, however, courts can step in
to help end this exploitation. However, many judges fail to recognize the symbiotic
206. See, e.g., Arsberry v. Illinois, 244 F.3d 558, 564–65 (7th Cir. 2001).
207. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S 78, 89 (1987).
208. See id.
209. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 207 F.3d 650, 656 (9th Cir. 2000).
210. See, e.g., Pope v. Hightower, 101 F.3d 1382 (11th Cir. 1996) (reversing a lower court decision
that phone call regulations violated the First Amendment).
211. Peter R. Schults, Calling the Supreme Court: Prisoners’ Constitutional Right To Telephone Use,
92 B.U. L. REV. 369, 380–90 (2012).
212. Andrew Leon Hanna, The Present Constitutional Status of Solitary Confinement, 21 J. CONST.
L. ONLINE 1, 6 (2019) (quoting Alexander A. Reinert, Solitary Troubles, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 927, 957
(2018)) (noting that “the Constitution has played almost no role in substantively limiting [solitary
confinement’s] use”).
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nature of the industry and correctional agencies. As a result, plaintiffs do not have
access to constitutional suits—a powerful tool of reform for incarcerated people
over the past few decades. Recognizing that prison telecom corporations are state
actors is just a small step—but it is a step towards ending this exploitation for good.

